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Since 1979, agricultural producers
and financial institutions have been
buffeted by volatile interest rates. The
uncertainty created by the deregulated
environment has caused many agricultural
bankers to re-evaluate their lending
practices. Increasingly, agricultural
lenders are using variable interest rate
loans and differential pricing to shift
the risks of uncertain interest rates to
producers.
Variable interest rate loans enable
banks to maintain the interest rate
spread between the interest rates they
must pay to obtain loanable capital and
the interest rates they charge their
borrowers. As the interest rate
increases or declines on their loanable
capital, the variable interest rates on
loans can be altered to reflect the
change.
Differential . pricing of .loans
implies charging different interest
rates to different borrowers. Interest
rates charged on a loan are based on the
costs of the loan to the lender and the
loan's contribution to profits. High
risk customers are charged higher
interest rates because of their greater
potential for loan default and higher
loan servicing costs.
This newsletter will examine: (1)
the prevalence of these two lending
practices among South Dakota.
Brookings, SD 57007 Tele: (605) 688-4141
^ricultural bankers and (2) the
implications of differential pricing on
the ability of farmers and ranchers to
carry specific levels of debt.
Prevalence of Variable Interest
Rates and Differential Pricing
The majority of the South Dakota
bankers surveyed by Mark Edelman, Diane
Kolmer, and the authors in November 1984
are using both differential pricing and
variable interest rates on their
agricultural operating loans (Table 1).
Further, nearly "80 percent of the 123
banker respondents were using at least
one of these lending practices for their
agricultural operating loans.
Table 1. Prevalence o-f SelectSd Lending
Practices by South Dakota Banks,
November 1, 1984.
Number Percent
Lending Practices Used
a
of Banks of Total
Dl-f-ferential Loan Pricing 20 16.3
Variable Interest Rates 15 12.2
Both Dif-ferential Loan Pricing 63 51.2
and Variable Rates
PiKed Rates only 25 20.3
Total 123. 100.0
Use of these lending practices does
affect the producer's ability to safely
borrow money and the lender's ability to
safely lend money. liiese lending
practices alter the cost of debt capital
for the producer and the survivability
of the farming/ranching operation.
Variable interest rates make a
producer's cash flow more uncertain,
since the interest rate can change on
the loan. Because agriculture does not
always boom with the rest of the
economy, interest rates can go up
without a corresponding improvonent in
farm prices. Based on historical
evidence, producers and lenders should
not necessaily expect agricultural
prices to improve v^en interest rates
increase.
Combine this fact with differential
interest rates for agricultural
operating loans, and the risk of debt
capital to the producer can increase
significantly. The producer must now
carry both the risk of changing interest
rates and the financial risk of his or
her failure in agriculture. On the other
hand, if interest rates do decline or if
toe producer's financial situation
improves, these lending practices will
lower the producer's loan interest rate.
The producer does receive this potential
benefit for carrying the risk.
To gain a perspective on the risks
of carrying debt capital, let us first
examine differential interest rates
being charged by South Dakota
bankers in November of 1984.
Differential Interest Rates Charged
Agricultural bankers were asked to
report the annual percentage rate (APR)
that they were charging on agricultural
operating loans by risk class. APR
represents the actual or the true rate
of interest for the year.
Table Annual Percentage Rate (APR) Charged -for
Operating Loans, November 1, 1984 -for
Banks Using Di-f-ferential Pricing.
16.45 percent. For all regions, the
highest risk borrower would, on average,
be paying interest rates in excess of
15.50 percent. Furthermore, nearly 25
percent of the banks using differential
loan pricing had differences of at least
3.00 percent.
The, implications of this type of
interest rate structure to producers are
illustrated via a hypothetical case
study farm with different levels of debt
for a specified financial structure.
Assumptions of the Case Study Farm
For this case study farm, we will
assune the following conditions
concerning the profitability of the
farm, its debt level and the lender's
use of differential pricing:
1. The case study farm has $200,000
in sales, and a gross margin of
$25,000 before interest exj^nse and
income taxes.
The total
percentage
for the
following
30 percent.
amount of debt as a
of assets is varied
case farm at the
levels: 15 percent,
45 percent, '60 percent
and 75 percent. Total assets are
fixed at $500,000.Description
Average APR Charged -for
Lowest Risk Class
Average Di-fference in
APR between Highest
and Lowest Risk Class
Average APR for Highest
Risk Class
Northeast Southeast West River
13. 637.
2.637.
16.267.
13.547.
2. 16-/;
15.707.
13.387.
3.077.
16. 457.
The average APR for the lowest risk
class was fairly uniform across South
Dakota (Table 2). The average APR for
the lowest risk class borrowers ranged
between 13.63 percent in the Northeast
and 13.38 percent West River.
However, the average difference
between the lowest and highest APR
charged varied considerably among
regions. For West River, the average
difference between the lowest risk class
and highest risk class was 3.07 percent.
This would imply that the lowest risk
borrower would have an interest rate of
13.38 percent, while the high risk
borrower would have an interest rate of
3.
4.
Associated with each of the five
debt to asset percentages is a
different degree of financial risk
for the lender. To ccanpensate
the lender for the greater
financial risk of increased
leverage, the assumed interest
rate is increased 0.75 percent for
each step-up in the debt to asset
percentage.
Actual differential interest rate
systens are based on a broader
set of credit factors than simply
the debt to asset ratio. Also,
the size of the step-up in interest
rates and the number of risk
classes will vary among lenders.
For c<^^rison purposes, the
diffsifintial interest rate structure is
compared to an interest rate structure
v^ere the same interest rate is charged
to the case study farm independent of
the farm's debt to asset ratio.
/Profitability
Interest Rates
Under Constant
Assume in all five debt to asset
situations that the case farm is charged
an interest rate of 13.50 percent (Panel
B, Table 3). Earnings after inccsne taxes
and interest expenses range from $12,644
with a 15. ^rcent debt to asset ratio to
~$25,625 with a 75 percent debt to asset
ratio.
Return to owners equity equals .the
earnings after interest expense "and
income taxes divided by owners equity.
This represents what the owner of the
farming operation would be earning on
his or her investment. The owner of a
case farm with a 15 percent debt to
asset ratio would realize a 2.98 percent
return to their investment. with 75
percent debt, the return to the owner
declines to -20.50 percent. The adverse
impact of greater debt on a producer's
returns is readily apparent.
A critical question to ask is,
"What does the additional debt capital
cost the case study farm as the debt to
asset ratio changes?" For each step-up
in the debt to asset ratio, the case
farm substitutes $75,000 of additional
debt capital for $75,000 of equity
capital. With a constant interest rate,
the additional interest expense simply
equals the interest rate of 13.50
• percent times the $75,000 of additional
d^t capital or $10,125. The additional
debt capital costs the producer 13.50
^rcent as the debt to asset ratio
increases.
Implications of Differential
Interest Rates
With differential rates, the lowest
rate assumed is 12.50 percent.
Typically, banks using a differential
interest rate syston offer a lower APR
to_ the lowest risk borrower than banks
using uniform interest rates. The APR
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